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Arctic geopolitics involve a number of unique and complicated factors. Not only are 
larger historical dynamics at play, but polic-makers are also struggling with new 
technological advancements and their impact on day-to-day interactions that shape 
policy. This paper works towards a more predictive theory for Arctic Geopolitics by 
applying Edgar Schein’s Model of Organizational Culture and Leadership to US and 
Russian national security bodies. By doing so, the paper argues that national security 
professionals can better understand themselves and their foreign counterparts, and that 
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Why does the Arctic geopolitical environment look the way that it does? Ask 1,000 
experts and you’ll get 1,000 different explanations. Ask one set of Arctic national 
security panelists at the 2019 Halifax International Security Forum and you’ll come away 
with a sense that the correct answer isn’t coming from Dr. Thomas Axeworthy.   
The Halifax International Security Forum is an annual meeting of policy 
professionals and experts who come together each year in Halifax, Ontario, to discuss 
national security threats expected in the upcoming year. The forum’s plenary session The 
End of the World: The Arctic, was framed by an academic paper from Dr. Thomas 
Axeworthy questioning the efficacy of Canada’s recently-released Arctic strategy.  
The paper pointed out that Canada had not provided a strategy at all, as it contained 
“neither an implementation plan nor concrete policy choices” on how to address the 
country’s well-known issues, but those of Russia and China did.1 He then compared the 
Canadian government’s headway on addressing its national security challenges to that of 
the Chinese and Russian governments, respectively. He was clearly asking why Canadian 
national security professionals were neglecting what he considered to be an important 
piece of Canada’s national security strategy: a well-thought out national security strategy. 
His question: what role does a national security strategy play in addressing national 
security issues?  
The panelists, who were all public servants, military personnel and decision makers, 
paid no mind to Axeworthy’s paper or central question. They spent the time discussing 
their own views and experiences, even when asked by the moderatWord did not find 
any entries for your table of contents.or to discuss their thoughts on the paper. 





paper, and her response was a defense Canada’s strategy document. She described the 
Arctic as a “harsh environment” in need of specialized equipment, infrastructure, and 
expensive technologies, concluding that with so many aspirations and pushes for action, 
“it just doesn’t always happen.”2 
This example demonstrates how much uncertainty and complexity is involved in 
Arctic geopolitical discourse. In an effort to help clarify that discourse and possibly 
restore a sense of predictability to events in the region, this paper asks, What processes 
do national security bodies use to create national security policies? I argue that while 
each body uses a different process to craft national security policies, Edgar Schein’s 
Model of Organizational Culture and Leadership from corporate communications theory 
can successfully yield insights into those processes in a way that improves predictability 
in Arctic geopolitics.  
 
A Region in Flux 
In recent years, the Arctic as a geographical area rose to one of the premier national 
security priorities for an increasing number of countries. The increased attention puts 
pressure on conflicts and unsolved problems, the old and the new. Russian President 
Vladimir Putin put it well when he described the Arctic as “a concentration of practically 
all aspects of national security – military, political, economic, technological, 
environmental and that of resources.”3 Alongside these more traditional national security 
considerations are the new realities brought on by an increasingly interconnected and 
globalized world, including strategic inertia, isolationism, reactivity, the 24-hour news 
cycle, and shortsightedness.  
																																																								
2 Video Recording: 2019 Halifax International Security Forum. Plenary Session 2 The End of the World: 
The Arctic. https://halifaxtheforum.org/forum/2019-halifax-international-security-forum/saturday-
november-23/#agenda, minute 9:30.  
3 “Заседание Совета Безопасности По Вопросу Реализации Государственной Политики в Арктике,” 
Президент России, 22 Apr. 2014, kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20845. 
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Dr. Jeremi Suri writes in his recent book, The Impossible Presidency, that the current 
approach to policy making leaves top decision makers under tremendous pressure to react 
immediately to the most pressing crisis. This leaves “little space for thought and 
creativity about policy, or much of anything else.”4 Part of this tremendous pressure has 
to do with the rapid advancement of technology and the “tyranny of the news cycle” has 
been described as one of the most disruptive realities for strategic planning in the U.S. 
National Security Council, specifically.5  
It is in this space of chaos, pressure, and a never-ending deluge of crises that the U.S. 
National Security Council has found itself trapped. The body responsible for U.S. 
national security, the National Security Council, has mostly considered defensive national 
security concerns in the Arctic, but has still struggled to articulate the specific work to be 
done in its national security strategies. As a result, onlookers frequently complain that 
opportunities to address major challenges in the Arctic have instead become platforms for 
U.S. leaders to spout “clichés and empty political phrases about freedom and 
innovation.”6 
The result, for US national security stance towards the Arctic, is a static narrative 
about the types of national security concerns to be found there: that China and Russia 
pose a grave existential threat to the free world and the U.S. must be prepared to defend 
against an attack from them at a moment’s notice.7  
The result of this narrative is a policy approach that emphasizes general military 
building-ups in the Arctic and a fixation on defending natural resources claims.8 Secretary 
of State Mike Pompeo transformed a speech on the economic potential of the Arctic into 
a melodrama in which he “cast the Arctic as simply the setting for a three-way struggle in 
																																																								
4 Jeremi Suri, The Impossible Presidency, Hatchette Book Group, New York (2017), 289.		
5 David J. Rothkopf, Running the World: the inside Story of the National Security Council and the 
Architects of American Power, Public Affairs, 2006: 458.  
6 Dermot Cole, “How a Myopic View of the Arctic Hampers US Policy,” The Arctic Today, October 20, 
2019. https://www.arctictoday.com/how-a-myopic-view-of-the-arctic-hampers-u-s-policy/. 
7	Jacquelyn	Chorush,	“’Prepared	to	go	Fully	Kinetic.’”	
8 Michael Pompeo, “Looking North.” 
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which the United States, Russia and China find themselves wrestling for regional 
supremacy.”9  
While there is no clear description of what precise threats that China and Russia 
pose, there is also no plan to address the non-military challenges in the Arctic. Russia has 
made strides in increasing its Arctic shipping capacity and has even been surpassing its 
own strategic objectives in the region.10 China has deeply entrenched itself into the Arctic 
space despite being a non-Arctic state.  
Observers note that “China’s conservative approach to developing an Arctic strategy 
has been successful, as the country is now widely viewed as a significant Arctic player 
after only a few short years of intensive regional engagement.”11 U.S. national security 
leaders continue to dismiss the importance of non-military Arctic development, as well as 
the strategic, non-military footholds of Russian and Chinese rivals.  
Many Arctic littoral states have also been eagerly preparing themselves for the 
economic boon expected in the near future, as well as considering the environmental 
consequences of climate change. The anticipation is so great that it has fanned the flames 
of succession amongst Greenlanders who seek independence from Denmark. An article 
from the economist entitled, “Chinese investment may help Greenland become 
independent from Denmark,” explains how the economic opportunities of a melting 
Arctic are changing the calculus of Greenlanders and could ultimately change the layout 
of the map.12  
The region is clearly in flux. The various dimensions and opportunities for U.S. 
involvement continue to multiply, but eventually those windows will close and new 
																																																								
9 Cole, “How a Myopic View.”		
10	Charles Digges, “Russia releases massive official plans for the Northern Sea Route,” Bellona.org, 
January 9 2020, https://bellona.org/news/arctic/2020-01-russia-releases-massive-official-plans-for-the-
northern-sea-route.	
11 Marc Lanteigne, “China’s Emerging Strategies in the Arctic,” The High North News, April 24, 2019 
https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/chinas-emerging-strategies-arctic.  





geopolitical power structures will ossify. At that time, the chance for U.S. leaders to 
secure the country a powerful, enduring national security position in the Arctic will 
significantly decline. By the time that everything else in the region becomes locked in, 
the U.S. may be locked out.  
 
Where IR Theory Falls Short in the Arctic  
International relations theories exist to help simplify a complex world, offering a 
sense of predictability and order. But unfortunately, the Arctic, in particular, provides an 
especially difficult case for these theories.  
Theories of each individual school (realism, liberalism, and constructivism) are 
poorly suited to the Arctic context. One example of this is the threat of climate change in 
the Arctic, which realist theory would not currently be able to conceptualize. Threats to 
the international system, from a realist perspective, come directly from the presence of 
accumulated military power. Realism is designed to deal with kinetic military threats 
posed by other states, not existential threats to human civilization. Realism generally 
predicts that failing to project superior military power will invite a military confrontation 
from Russia and/or China.  
Many of these predictions clash entirely with the predictions of liberalism in the 
Arctic. Liberalism emphasizes opportunities for cooperation and mutually beneficial 
trade, suggesting that economic interconnectedness will reduce the possibility of armed 
conflict.  
And then there is Constructivism, a less popular but growing school of thought, 
which focuses more on how unique cultural perspectives help to shape political 
relationships in the region and is far less prescriptive. Such theories would be inherently 
less relevant to national security decision makers because without a concrete structure, it 
suggests that everything to do with human behavior impacts the international system to 
some degree. And if everything is important, nothing is.  
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IR theory is also plagued by another issue: it tends to classify variables as either a one 
or a zero. There is not a range for anarchy in the international system, there is not a range 
for miscalculations or democracy. There is not a range for statehood, even if some states 
appear more stable than others. In IR theory, often times something either is or is not—it is 
an all or nothing binary. But we also know that national security professionals spend a 
great deal of time trying to assess these very variables.  
In some instances, predictions from one school of thought prove correct. In other 
instances, they do not. What experts and veterans in the field have generally noted is that 
no one school of thought holds all of the answers, and instead a familiarity with all is 
important.  
Without more prescriptive and reliable theories, policy makers and academics are 
forced to jump back and forth from past to present trying to either align the current 
variables with past variables to make direct policy suggestions, or they are creating 
Frankenstein policies that combine variables from various historic events. The more there 
is to consider, the less IR theory is able to keep up.  
As a result, there is a growing gap between theory and practice in international 
relations, leading a number of experts to conclude that IR theory is irrelevant. One of IR 
theory’s harshest critics, author of the recent book The Cult of the Irrelevant: The 
Waning Influence of Social Science on National Security Michael C. Desch, argues that 
the gap has been widening for decades, and academic work on national security now has 
a very minor influence on actual policy decisions.  
Competing predictions, rising complexity, and general uncertainty about the future 
do not lend much to U.S. policymakers aside from fueling a chaotic atmosphere of 
apprehension, fear and excitement—an atmosphere where lots of words are said but few 
decisions actually get made. Experts are missing a compelling process to generate 
recommendations that policy makers are more readily able to act on.  
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While each school of thought helps to illuminate a different dimension of Arctic 
geopolitical relationships, when it comes to crafting policy there is no set structure for 
considering them alongside one another. Unfortunately, when good judgment is the best 
tool and there is too much information to ever feel informed, policy makers find 
themselves stretched too thin to think clearly and commit to a comprehensive strategy.  
 
How National Security Bodies Operate 
Understanding how a model from organizational communications theory might apply 
to national security bodies better than IR theories requires a brief overview of the role 
national security interests serve in the international realm.  
Regardless of a country’s model of government, a single government body generally 
handles critical decisions on state survival. In Russia and the United States, the top 
national leaders and advisors are members of that body. While special interests and non-
governmental actors may indirectly influence national security policies, those policies 
ultimately come from this closed circle of people.  
There are elements of realist theory involved in how national security bodies 
function. An interest in survival, the central motivator of realist theory, is the key variable 
in national security matters. Fear is instinctive, and it is universal. It has a profound 
influence on human behavior. Non-state actors like multinational corporations and 
international organizations, major actors in liberal theory, create powerful additional 
pressures.  
Their priorities often relate to the accumulation of material value and political power, 
respectively, both of which relate directly to a sense of control. It is no coincidence that 
liberal theory emphasizes cooperation and integration for mutual benefit as a method for 
reducing conflict. These powerful restraints on acceptable state behaviors naturally 
influences national security policy. And especially when it comes to national security, we 




The U.S. National Security Council has a structure for crafting national security 
strategy that makes indecisiveness, and the resulting absence of a clear strategy, difficult 
to avoid. The security dimensions in the Arctic are also too vast and too complex for 
current approaches to IR theory to offer many holistic, realistic recommendations. A 
widely recognized gap between IR theory and practice makes it even more difficult to 
formulate a coherent Arctic strategy—a mechanism that should enhance efficiency is 
currently out of alignment.  
Without that added guidance, policy professionals must depend more heavily on 
their own judgment. In as complex a region as the Arctic, this can translate into trying to 
reinvent the wheel each time they make a policy decision. It also makes them much more 
vulnerable to criticism. These circumstances mean that they are even less willing to take 
firm policy stances. Mounting domestic pressures further reduce policy options. 
This paper seeks to define the unique decision-making structure of the U.S. 
National Security Council and how that structure influences its Arctic policies. The 
National Security Council does not make decisions in a vacuum. Instead, its members 
rely on consistent geopolitical frameworks and face the same recurring policy limitations 
and red tape. Understanding this decision-making structure is a critical first step in 
overcoming the problems that have hindered efforts to undertake urgent and important 
work.  
The products that the US National Security Council provides are leadership, policy, 
economic opportunity, and influence. But there are broad limitations on the types of 
national security “products” that the council can provide. Organizational communications 
theory has been grappling with similar problems brought on by globalization and 
international integration for some time.  
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Reactivity relates to “adaptability” in organizational communications theory, which 
refers to how well an organization adapts to constant and unpredictable disruptions. The 
24-hour news cycle burdens the National Security Council in very similar ways to how it 
burdens private organizations. Shortsightedness is a consequence of that reactivity—
constantly working in triage is a distraction from the big picture considerations. 
The intended “product” is warped by factors both within and outside of the United 
States. “The impulse among American voters is for swift, dramatic, emotionally 
satisfying solutions to the issues of the day. But most issues require long, time-
consuming, complex, expensive commitments.”13 They also have “expectations for rapid 
achievements” but current issues are “too diffuse and difficult for any single leader to 
integrate them in a coherent narrative.”14 This makes it all the more difficult to move 
forward and achieve successes that the general public deems satisfying.  
The problems are patterns of behavior and thought that sometimes steer policy in 
suboptimal directions. A first step is to understand those patterns and how they exist and 
function in the US National Security Council, and then to show that by revealing 
important characteristics of the National Security Council of the Russian Federation, and 
then showing how, given this information, the US is missing out on major opportunities 
to advance towards national security priorities in the Arctic.  
IR theory does not offer a methodology suitable for the research question: What 
processes do national security bodies use to create national security policies? Instead of 
choosing between realism, liberalism, or constructivism as a methodological lens, this 
thesis will explore the question using Edgar Schein’s Model of Organizational Culture 
and Leadership, a well-regarded model from organizational communications theory that 
has been rigorously tested in the private sector.  
This thesis will apply Schein’s model to better understand decision making 
processes in the US and Russian Security Councils and consider if the results yeild a 
																																																								
13 Rothkopf, Running the World, 459.  
14 Suri, The Impossible Presidency, 289.		
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better understanding of their respective Arctic policies. The rest of this thesis will be 
divided into five chapters: the methodology, a case study on the U.S. National Security 
Council, a case study on the Security Council of the Russian Federation, application of 






From the standpoint of a national security professional, making national security 
decisions involves two general steps. The first is determining the desired policy outcome, 
and the second is determining how to best achieve the desired policy outcome. Step one 
is about accuracy and step two is about feasibility. The national security problem that this 
paper seeks to address deals more with the second step—feasibility. Barriers in the form 
of the 24-hour news cycle, reactivity, etc., make it more difficult to go from desired 
outcomes to real outcomes.  
But in as high stakes a game as national security, fear and time pressures lead to a 
default response: prepare for anything and everything. And as mentioned previously, that 
is not strategy. That is triage, and never allows for more than responding to short-term 
needs. Larger and recurring issues are neglected—only to once again become a top 
priority when a crisis emerges.   
How to Conceptualize this Phenomenon 
 
Theories often include an “error term” acknowledging that since theories offer 
simplified views of the world, they do not always offer a perfect description of reality. 
An error term in national security matters and strategic thinking appears in Carl Von 
Clausewitz’s writings on friction in his classic text On War.  
This thesis will categorize that error term as “entropy.” Entropy is a physics term 
referring to a measure of the unavailable energy in a closed system, or “a measure of the 
system’s disorder.”15 At its most basic, “entropy” suggests that less is more; the less you 
have going on, the more energy and attention you have readily available to devote 
elsewhere. The concept of “entropy” offers a useful way to conceptualize the complex 
																																																								
15 Gordon W.F. Drake, “Entropy,” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 7 June 2018, 
www.britannica.com/science/entropy-physics.	
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reality that decision-makers face because it implies that there is a zero-sum element to the 
time and resources that policy makers have at their disposal. Each expenditure implies an 
opportunity cost, and every issue commands precious attention.  
 The result is an equation representing the decision-making process, but in a way 
that sees the final outcome as the interaction of a target goal with the confines of reality: 
 
Real Policy outcome = Perfect Policy Outcome (0) + the final entropy 
value (n)  
 
The entropy value is higher when many things are happening and is lower when the 
system quiets down. The goal of a state is survival, and the method for this is maintaining 
control—reducing entropy. If a state has total control and behaves purely on its survival 
instincts, then we would expect the entropy value to approach zero. The lower the 
entropy, the more effectively the national security body can function in the interest of 
national security. Realism is most predictive when entropy is low. But the more entropy 
there is in the system, the more complex the system becomes and the more we must 
consider liberalism and constructivism in how national security bodies behave.  
Entropy encompasses the miscalculations, the entire world of actors, the cultural 
influences, etc. Entropy includes fear, economic interests, and identity, and anything else 
that is relevant.  Anything that could possibly factor into a national security body making 
process would contribute to its entropy level. And the entropy level is always in flux. 
This conceptualization of national security policy can help explain why the Arctic is 
proving so difficult to manage. It is in flux, there are so many moving parts, and as a 
result the entropy value is higher. The Arctic geopolitical environment becomes more 
difficult to predict. That means security policy becomes more convoluted. This is in part 
a product of unique characteristics of the physical Arctic environment, but also has a lot 
to do with increasing levels of globalization.  
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Each characteristic of the current geopolitical environment can be understood as a 
source of entropy: understandings of global dynamics, larger historical forces that apply 
pressure, transition periods, the difficulty in separating short and long-term concerns, 
deep human bias that projects past experience even if it leads to misguided conclusions.  
The entropy value is very high, and national security professionals are working 
around the clock to minimize it. But professionals have struggled to successfully manage 
the common national security barriers (24-hour news cycle, reactivity, etc.), which are all 
contributing to the high final entropy value. When national security strategists weigh the 
importance of realism, liberalism, constructivism, context, history, etc., what they are 
actually doing is trying to identify and account for these burgeoning sources of entropy.  
 Thinking of international relations in this way, what national security strategists 
would most benefit from is a tool that helps them identify, prioritize, and manage primary 
sources of entropy. This means taking several steps backwards from the question of Why 
does Arctic geopolitics look the way that it does? and instead asking How can we better 
understand the behavior of national security bodies? That requires the researcher to 
looking for patterns that help increase a sense of predictability about these organizations.   
 
Corporate Communications Theory Can Identify Patterns in these 
Processes 
When it comes to social science fields with a minimal gap between theory and 
practice, corporate communications and organizational cultures looks particularly 
promising because practice is heavily informed by the research. There are connections to 
be drawn between how political and corporate institutions function in the international 
realm and strategize to meet goals.  
Because “feasibility” considerations have more to do with how organizations behave 
and what they value, as opposed to actual national security concerns, insight into these 
patterns of identity and culture will be important. Dr. Edgar Schein’s Model of 
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Organizational Culture and Leadership is designed to uncover the unique and largely 
hidden characters of organizations. By examining the organization and discerning its 
unique cultural signature (or “cultural DNA”), Schein believes organizations will be more 
able to implement positive changes and become better suited for accomplishing their 
goals.16  
This means that instead of offering policy prescriptions that work in theory, the model 
would help provide a tailored analysis of how the organization functions and what criteria 
a policy suggestion must meet in order to click into place. Approaching the problem from 
this angle provides a new avenue for hope that it is possible to bridge the growing gap 
between theory and practice.  
What Edgar Schein’ Model Says 
Schein’s model is used to better understand the processes organizations use to meet 
their goals, identify cultural maladaptions that interfere with those processes, and 
ultimately offer suggestions for how to change or eliminate the cultural maladaptations. 
According to Schein, culture is a:  
“pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group has 
learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and 
internal integration, that has worked well enough to be 
considered valid, and, therefore, to be taught to new members as 
the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those 
problems."17  
 
Schein’s model also instructs the researcher to look at the influence of the 
macroculture, or the general cultural environment in which the organization must 




17 Katherine Miller, Organizational Communication: Approaches and Processes, Cengage 
Learning/Wadsworth, 2015: 89.  
	 15	
organization is embedded and must function, and as Schein explains, they can be 
“nations, occupations, or large organizations.”18 
While Schein's theory allows us to focus on whatever body is vested with the power 
to make national security decisions, there are also important elements of liberal ideology 
that can function in this space. Schein allows us to take into account how other internal 
and external considerations factor into decision making, changing its calculus from one 
that entirely focuses on gut survival instinct.  
If nuances matter, then we need to incorporate them into the theory. Patterns of 
competing interests matter if they are shaping policy. Last but not least, constructivism, 
which focuses on culture but has been too overwhelming for policymakers, fits into 
Schein's work, but he offers a more holistic method for turning complex dynamics into 
bite-size chunks, but in a way that allows us to consider the theories in a more holistic 
sense.  
Schein’s model suggests that evidence of the organizational culture can be found at 
three distinct, yet interconnected, levels: 1) cultural artifacts, 2) espoused values, and 3) 
tacit assumptions. Cultural artifacts tend to include tangible items and items produced by 
the organization. These artifacts produced by national security bodies would include 
policies, reports, speeches, autobiographies of former members, and books written by 
strategists and national security professionals.  
Artifacts reveal an organization’s espoused values—what the organization stands for, 
seeks to achieve, and aspires to be. Common national security values include ensuring 
safety, economic prosperity, freedom, and protection for the country.  
When there is a firm understanding of the artifacts and espoused values, and how they 
function in the organization, one can begin to understand the less obvious beliefs held by 
organizational members—what Schein refers to as “tacit assumptions.”  
																																																								
18 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 3.  
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Tacit assumptions can be completely invisible to outsiders, and insiders are also often 
not fully aware of them or how they influence the organization. Tacit assumptions can 
yield the greatest insights because they are often more deterministic of how the 
organization behaves than any other level. These tacit assumptions, while they may relate 
to the organization’s goals, also may not. They could stem from the unique culture itself 
and may be poorly adapted for reaching organizational goals.  
 The three levels, in tandem, tell us who the organization is—its unique cultural 
DNA. Schein defines cultural DNA as: “the beliefs, values, and desired behaviors that 
launched the group and made it successful. This early level of beliefs, values and desired 
behavior becomes nonnegotiable and turns into taken-for-granted basic assumptions that 
subsequently drop out of awareness…culture-change programs can work only if they are 
consistent with the group’s cultural DNA.”  Schein argues that in order for a leader to 
successfully execute institutional change, the changes must be consistent with the 
organization’s unique cultural DNA. 
Instead of devoting time and attention to culture content, or the infinite cultural 
artifacts that national security professionals’ overload themselves with, professionals can 
look instead at the far more manageable and predictable cultural structure. Uncovering 
the cultural structure requires an organized approach to evaluating culture content. Schein 
identifies 12 culture content areas. They are:  
1. Observable behavior when people interact. Schein describes the 
observable behaviors as “the language [members] use along with the regularities in the 
interaction… observed interaction patterns, customs, and traditions become evident in all 
groups in a variety of situations.”   This factor is constituted by the most obvious, surface 
level codes of conduct between the institutional members. Careful attention helps to 
reveal unique dynamics between group members, offering more detailed insight into how 
these individuals process information and make decisions.  
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2. Climate. Schein describes this factor as the “feeling that is conveyed in a group 
by the physical layout and the way in which members of the organization interact with 
each other, with customers, or with other outsiders.”  What are the physical aspects of the 
environments in which the group makes decisions? What tone exists in the interactions 
between members, or between the group and outsiders? Does the institution conduct 
meetings in a towering, inaccessible government building? Or in a more humble meeting 
space that allows for visitors and is highly visible? What does this communicate about 
how the institution sees itself and its relationship to the outside world?  
 
3. Formal rituals and celebrations. This factor is captured in “the ways in 
which a group celebrates key events that reflect important values or important “passages” 
by members such as promotion, completion of important projects, and milestones.”  How 
do these institutions celebrate their successes? Are such rituals communicated to the 
outside world, or are they are more private affair? What special privileges do they convey 
to their members?  
 
4. Espoused Values. These are “the articulated, publicly announced principles 
and values that the group claims to be trying to achieve.”  In the corporate world, they are 
such things as “product quality,” “price leadership, or “safety.” In the policy world, they 
might manifest as “freedom” or “democracy” or “economic prosperity.” These values are 
often articulated in such things as autobiographies and recruiting materials.  They are also 
geared towards the populations that the institutions must serve. They help create a vision 
of what the government seeks to provide for its citizens, and articulate what the quality of 
life in the respective country should look like.  
 
5. Formal Philosophy. These are “the broad policies and ideological principles 
that guide a group’s actions toward stockholders, employees, customers, and other 
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stakeholders.”  When applied to a policy world, a formal philosophy would be 
communicated towards such things as France’s long held motto “liberty, equality, 
fraternity.” This differs from espoused values because it is more uniquely tailored to a 
specific macro-culture. While espoused values can be widely shared, formal philosophies 
set out a more detailed, unique vision.  
 
6. Group norms. Schein describes group norms as “the implicit standards and 
values that evolve in working groups, such as the particular norm of ‘a fair day’s work 
for a fair day’s pay.’”  These may be norms about preparedness—such as expectations 
that all group members read the morning paper before appearing together so that they are 
on the same page about current events. These can be longstanding norms within the 
institution, or they can vary with the group membership.  
 
7. Rules of the game. Here, Schein refers to “the implicit, unwritten rules for 
getting along in the organization.”  This can be something like “never give the boss bad 
news.” From this factor, an organization can enter into maladaptive patterns such as 
“groupthink.” Such rules can shed light on who has the most decision-making authority 
within the group, even if it is not aligned with the structural design of the institution.  
 
8. Identity and images of self.  This refers to “how the organization views itself 
in terms of ‘who we are,’ ‘what is our purpose,’ and ‘how we do things.’  Does this 
organization see itself as a proud hero of the people? A champion of the underdogs? A 
mediator between powerful, often conflicting forces? This can be based in the history of 
the macro-culture, but also evolved from the history of the institution itself.   
 
9. Embedded skills.  Schein describes this factor as “the special competencies 
displayed by group members in accomplishing certain tasks, the ability to make certain 
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things that get passed on from generation to generation without necessarily being 
articulated in writing.”  These “skills” may be directly linked with macro-cultures. 
Leaders may be able to harness these skills by tapping into the macro-culture and 
understanding from past leaders how best to navigate the unique policy environment.   
 
10. Habits of thinking, mental models, or linguistic paradigms. These are 
“the shared cognitive frames that guide the perceptions, thoughts, and language used by 
the members of a group and are taught to new members in the socialization or 
“onboarding” process.”  How do members of the group talk about their roles, or describe 
the outside world? This is connected to factor 8, Identity and Image of Self, yet it refers 
to the processes and channels through which views of self and the outside world are 
established. What lenses are the members looking through as they attempt to describe 
themselves and others? What are their conceptions of other institutions and cultures with 
which they interact?  
 
11. Shared Meanings. Schein explains this as “the emergent understandings that 
are created by group member as they interact with each other where the same words used 
in different cultures can have very different meanings.”  For example, although each 
institution may refer regularly to “national security,” this term may have developed very 
different meanings in each cultural context. It is important to understand precisely what 
values, goals, and threats mean in each context.  
 
12. Root metaphors or integrating symbols. Schein describes this factor as 
“the ways that groups evolve to characterize themselves, which may or may not be 
appreciated consciously but become embodied in buildings, office lay-outs, and other 
material artifacts of the group. This level of the culture reflects the emotional and 
aesthetic response of members as contrasted with the cognitive or evaluative response.”   
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This stems more from the basic assumptions, which draw from the history behind each 
institution. These metaphors and symbols will be deeply entrenched and can yield 
powerful insights into the basic assumptions guiding the group. 
 
Acknowledging that it would be overwhelming to thoroughly explore all twelve of 
the culture content areas, Schein discourages using them as a formal checklist.19 He makes 
this point clear, leaving it up to the "personal needs and interests” of the researcher, 
whose discretion will guide the process.20  
An organization’s unique cultural structure is enduring. That is what we are looking 
for.  
 
A Case for Schein’s Model 
 Schein’s Model of Organizational Communication and Leadership provides a clearly 
defined tool for identifying patterns of behavior through elements of the scientific 
method. Schein explains that in order for the results to be valid, it must be replicable, 
predictable, and acceptable to members of the organization.21 Results satisfying this 
validity criteria, especially the “acceptability” factor, would be a godsend for national 
security professionals, who struggle to find research recommendations that actually 
sound like realistic options.  
If this model can help to explain how the primary actors in the national security realm 
behave, it may become easier to anticipate their behavior. If we can get closer to solving 
problems, and those solutions bring us closer to making more accurate predictions, then 
academics should no longer resign themselves to the idea that the IR gap cannot be 







Experts can pinpoint specific problems at much lower levels, but still have not been 
able to articulate clearly how those problems can be translated into solutions. Some 
things, like the NSC’s tendency to be reactive, seem easy enough to fix. Enough smart 
people both within and outside of the institution have recognized the issue. So why 
haven’t policy makers been able to free themselves? Schein’s theory can help us 
understand how cultural DNA, which is influenced by societal pressures, can make it 
more difficult for the national security professionals to cope with overwhelming levels of 
entropy. His model is also about how leaders can make organizational changes to 
improve functioning and reduce entropy levels.  
Professionals and academics also use the model to better understand the cultural DNA 
of other governments, and based on that information they can have a more structured way 
of understanding incoming data. They can do this by using Schein’s explanations of an 
organization’s manifest and latent functions. While manifest functions are made 
explicitly clear by organizational leadership, latent functions are not and may even be 
destructive to the organization if voiced. 22 Still, the two must be harmonized if the group’s 
identity is to survive.  
This helps to explain why political leaders are often forced into seemingly 
contradictory behaviors. This can also help to explain why political leaders may be 
pushed into inefficient, detrimental decisions. They encounter dissonance between 
manifest and latent functions and must struggle to harmonize the two. The manifest 
function for a national security institution is survival, in its purest form. Latent functions 
have to do with the unique culture under which these institutions function, and which 
sometimes pressure the organization to behave in ways that are inconsistent with its 
manifest function. Latent functions are the entropy patterns.  
Schein’s model focuses on the main actors, the bodies that determine national 
security policy, but also allows the researcher to look at sources of entropy that stem from 
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the macro-culture. National security bodies have a close connection to the country at 
large, from which it originated. They are connected by a social contract, of sorts. They 
serve and are bound by one another.  
 
How Schein’s Model Will Be Applied 
National security goals and objectives will be explored through Schein’s distinction 
between an organization’s manifest and latent functions. Manifest functions are easy to 
spot because they are regularly put on display. They are embedded in mission statements 
and appear explicitly on documents, in speeches, and in other forms of communication 
produced by the organizations. The divergence between the manifest functions and what 
the organization actually does reveals clues as to what the latent functions might me. The 
first step is to examine the available culture content, guided by the list of culture content 
areas, and identify any major discrepancies.  
While thoroughly covering all 12 of Schein’s categories would be ideal, it is too 
much for the scope of this project. Therefore, the two case study chapters applying 
Schein’s model will each focus on five of these 12. The five will be selected based off of 
background knowledge on each institution and what five categories seem most 
exemplified in how the organization functions. Schein does say that it is up to the 
discretion of the researcher to decide categories to emphasize. He explains that the 
selection of content areas has to do with the most striking elements of the organization, as 
observed by the researcher.23  
 
While the US NCS and SCRF case studies will differ in some respects, they will both 
look at:  
1. Legislation that establishes, regulates, and redefines national security duties 
2. National security doctrines 
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The definition of national security is subject to interpretation, and I argue that when it 
comes to governments, the concept is defined culturally long before a national security 
body is formed. Since both the US and Russian Federation define their governments from 
respective constitutions and legal systems, their respective national security bodies were 
established through legislation. This legislation will contain information from the various 
content areas. It will also make clear exactly what national security problems the body 
was established to address, and can also reveal assumptions in how duties are defined and 
carried out.  
Doctrines, or uniquely tailored sets of national security principles, provide 
justification for decisions or policy philosophies. They help to engage the public, both 
domestically and internationally, in national security conversations. In order to succeed, 
they must provide compelling narratives and can provide snapshots of the fears, symbols, 
and other identity markers used to communicate with the macro culture. Doctrines signal 
that something has changed in how the body plans to approach its national security goals. 
These shifts must be consistent with the cultural DNA of the NSC, but also with the 
macrocultural DNA.  
Doctrines are also important because by creating narratives of national security, they 
define and redefine what national security means. They create evolutions of the definition 
of national security—making them tools to manage macrocultural change. That is why 
the US NSC chapter will reach back centuries into the history of the US to identify the 
original national security meanings and values.  
While the doctrine section of the US NSC case study is organized around well-known 
doctrines, the doctrine section of the SCRF will break down Russian President Vladimir 
Putin’s leadership into three stages: his rise, his doctrinal shift in 2012, and his behavior 
following that shift. This is because leadership turnover rates in the US NSC and SCRF 
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differ significantly, and the age of the two countries differs significantly. These two 
considerations influence how I’ve chosen to approach both sections.  
 
The US NSC Culture Content Areas will be:  
• #4 Espoused Values  
• #5 Formal Philosophies  
• #8 Identity and Images of Self  
• #10 Habits of Thinking, Mental Models, or Linguistic Paradigms  
• #11 Shared Meanings  
 
The SCRF Culture Content Areas will be:  
• #4 Espoused Values 
• #5 Formal Philosophies  
• #8 Identity and Images of Self  
• #9 Embedded Skills  
• #10 Habits of Thinking, Mental Models, or Linguistic Paradigms  
 
The Arctic chapter will take the cultural DNA from both national security bodies and see 
if they carry any retrospective explanatory power in the Arctic.  
 
The Conclusions chapter will use the model to make predictions for the future, along with 
recommendations.  
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The National Security Council of the United States 
 
This chapter is about the internal sources of entropy for the National Security 
Council (NSC) of the United States. It begins with five sections (outlined below) and 
concludes with a synthesis of the important behavioral patterns that they suggest—the 
cultural DNA.24  
 
The pieces of legislation and national security doctrines examined in this chapter are:  
1) The National Security Act of 1947  
2) The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986  
3) The Monroe Doctrine  
4) The Truman Doctrine 
5) The Reagan Doctrine  
 
Each piece will be explored in the form of an immersive narrative, offering a full 
contextual understanding. This NSC case study, therefore, will look for patterns and 
discrepancies amongst five major events that are presented as brief snapshots in time.  
 
The Monroe Doctrine is the first major foreign policy doctrine in U.S. history, and 
has had a lasting influence on U.S. foreign policy, and the Roosevelt Corollary shows 
how foreign engagement principles shifted once the U.S. attained the status of a “Great 
Power.” The Truman Doctrine coincided with the National Security Act of 1947 and 
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provides an added layer of understanding to the critical pivot in U.S. foreign policy and 
national security decision-making. The Reagan Doctrine coincides with the Goldwater-
Nichols Act of 1986 and provides added insight, as well. The Bush Doctrine reveals more 
on how the U.S. national security council sought to adapt itself to a drastic increase in 
entropy: globalization, the digital age, and the threat of terrorism and non-state actors.  
 
The content areas I will devote my attention to are: Espoused Values; Formal 
Philosophies; Identity and Images of Self; Habits of Thinking, Mental Models, or 
Linguistic Paradigms; Shared Meanings. I expect to find inconsistencies between within 
and amongst the content areas.  
The final section pieces together an outline of how US NSC culture influences its 
policies, demonstrating the impact of long-held biases regarding itself, the country, and 
democracy.  
 
1. Legislation Defining the NSC and its Duties 
 
The National Security Act of 1947 
The United States was already 171 years old when the National Security Act of 
1947 established the National Security Council. A U.S. national security apparatus had 
existed when the country was founded, but the act formalized it, a more defined structure 
and set of duties.  While the NSC was a major development, its establishment was not the 
primary objective that U.S. leaders and policymakers had in mind. They crafted the 
legislation to address three problems that were logistical and theoretical in nature. World 
War Two had a profound impact on national security priorities and structures. The war 
exposed unclear lines of communication in U.S. defense structures, disorganization of the 
U.S. national security apparatus, and directly resulted in a major shift in IR discourse 
pertaining to understandings of U.S national security threats.  
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U.S. domestic institutions were proven inefficient and ill equipped, structurally, to 
deal with the complexities of fighting a war. Rothkopf explains “Of particular importance 
was learning from the experiences of the Second World War to ensure that we could 
balance our political and diplomatic interests and capabilities with our military and 
intelligence interests and capabilities.”25 One of the major bureaucratic weaknesses was 
that role responsibilities and communication channels in place for the war effort were 
poorly defined. Roosevelt unintentionally brought this to light, in part, with his style of 
organizational leadership. Since there was no clear chain of command to ensure that all 
major decisions crossed Roosevelt’s desk, he used his position of authority to rig the 
system in his favor. He intentionally made his bureaucracy chaotic and dysfunctional so 
that “important decisions were always passed on to the top,” which he believed would 
keep “ambitious men” from selfishly taking decision making authority on matters that he 
expected to be involved in. 26  
But Roosevelt’s system was a major headache for those who worked under him, 
and added to the general sense of panic and frenzy that accompanied the war effort. 27 
President Truman, along with “others in government who had seen the consequences of 
Roosevelt’s management style and determined that something needed to be done so that 
should the U.S. ever again face similar crises, the system of government would ensure a 
better process, capturing the views of more of the best minds available before decisions 
were to be made.”28 They wanted to ensure that in the future, U.S. defense structures 
would be adequately adapted to deal with major conflicts.  
The second problem, which gave particular haste to the legislation, was that U.S. 








the 1930s to the 1940s, the IR discipline underwent a profound shift from favoring 
‘idealism’ to favoring ‘realism.’ Idealists, now commonly referred to as liberals, 
dominated the IR discourse after the First World War and believed that international 
cooperation would prevent future wars. But that school of thought was thrown into a 
“scientific crisis” on the eve of the Second World War.29 The shift “was triggered by a 
number of ‘real world’ events—Manchuria, Abyssinia, the failure of the League, Munich, 
and the slide into war—but most importantly by the publication of E. H. Carr’s The 
Twenty Year’s Crisis.”30  
At the time his work was published in 1939, “realism, Carr’s alternative scientific 
standpoint [to idealism], offered not only a cogent explanation, but also the prospect of 
accurate prediction and effective policy prescription. It soon replaced idealism as the 
‘normal science’ of the field.”31 Carr shifted the dialogue by arguing that war was always 
a possibility, and thus the task was in predicting when war could be expected to occur. To 
support his point, Carr explained that “Clausewitz’s famous aphorism that ‘war is nothing 
but the continuation of political relations by other means’ has been repeated with 
approval both by Lenin and by the Communist International; and Hitler meant much the 
same thing when he said that ‘an alliance whose object does not include the intention to 
fight is meaningless and useless’.”32 Carr’s fascination with Soviet Russia and Marxism is 
apparent throughout The Twenty Year’s Crisis, although the degree to which this 
influenced U.S. policy makers to view the Soviet Union as a major threat to U.S. national 
security is unclear.  
The third problem, which was a direct result of the second problem, was that the 
United States chose a drastically more involved foreign policy position, which pivoted 
																																																								






towards a permanently more involved international presence, in anticipation of future 
conflicts. Thus, demands on U.S. institutions would be even more strained under the 
weight of their burgeoning responsibilities. There was an added need to design more 
robust, sophisticated foreign policy and defensive structures to protect the United States, 
along with the free world it sought to create, from those who sought to destroy them.  
The result of this new approach was a flourishing of foreign policy institutions and 
government structures. According to Rothkopf, in the aftermath of World War II, the 
United Stated developed powerful international institutions, as well as much needed 
domestic institutions to help address the increasingly complex global environment.33 One 
of these institutions is the National Security Council, which was established by the 
National Security Act of 1947.   
While the National Security Act of 1947 was primarily focused on restructuring the 
U.S. Department of Defense and creating the CIA—two areas that deal directly with 
preventing catastrophe—it also created the National Security Council to solve structural 
issues surrounding the President. It established a number of agencies, positions, and 
procedures, and provided authorization for infinite others. This is remarkable considering 
that the document itself has fewer than 20 pages and was passed within two years of the 
end of the war.  
        As written in the original Act of 1947:  
“The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect 
to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the 
national security so as to enable the military services and the other 
departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively 
in matters involving national security.”34 
 
But the legislation did something else with regards to the National Security 
Council. Informed by the shift in IR theory, drafters embedded realist understandings of 





the National Security Council, is roughly a page—quite brief for the enduring body that it 
created—and this is because the issue was conceptualized in a way that was simple and 
straightforward.  Following from the assumption that certain aggressive countries are 
always seeking out opportunities for war, the purpose of the National Security Council is 
clearly designed to be a hyper vigilant body that is in a perpetual race to prepare the 
country for war.  
The document reads that as directed by the President, the Council’s duty would 
be “to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in 
relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for 
the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith.”35 
These references to “actual” and “potential” military power are drawn directly from 
realist understandings of national security, and possibly were taken directly from Carr 
himself.  
In his book, Carr explains that “potential war” is the normal state of the 
international system, and because of that military power is the true political goal of 
states.36 Thus, under this conceptualization of national security, “potential” military power 
refers to any form of non-military capital, including economic power or public support, 
that at any moment can be translated into military power.  
Following from this, it would be implied that “objectives, commitments, and 
risks” would all have to do with actual and potential military power. And the 
responsibility for identifying and addressing these three central components of national 
security would fall to the National Security Council and Department of Defense.  
Towards the end of Title I, there is a reference to potential future uses of the 





other reports to the President as it deems appropriate or as the President may require.”37 
The vague and flexible nature of this responsibility reflects a lack of understanding, on 
part of the lawmakers, of what exactly the council would need to do in order to 
effectively serve U.S. national security interests. It is also important to note that the 
document includes no references to checks and balances between the branches, which is 
interesting considering what a dramatic increase in scale and power this act created in the 
Executive Branch. These lawmakers were not sure what to expect, but appear certain in 
their belief of the type of national security threats the nation would face: some sentient 
foe that actively sought to destroy the United States and the free world. As a result, 
drafters create a very narrow definition of national security, and design a structure meant 
to avoid wartime catastrophes. The National Security Council was established to serve as 
a wartime structure.  
 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 
In an effort to halt the spread of communism, the United States undertook the a 
number of military efforts that suffered from operational failures.38 The objective was to 
overthrow communism, and although the island was small, the United States military 
devoted an incredible amount of resources to the failed operation. Many of the problems 
encountered involved miscommunications between various sectors of the military.39  
This deeply disturbed U.S. leaders, both in the military and the Senate, and the 
failed operation became highly politicized. Senators were caught off guard and realized 
that they had little power over the national security structures of the Executive branch. 
Once again, the issues were both logistical and theoretical in nature. They drafted the 






The Goldwater-Nichols Act differed from the National Security Act of 1947 in 
length. The original document is 86 pages long and defines a clearer DoD structure by 
adjusting the chain of command and establishing new positions.40 Along with the 
restructuring of the Department of Defense, the drafters wanted to encourage more 
strategizing and contingency planning.41 They also sought to increase opportunities to 
exert Congressional oversight, and added a new responsibility for the National Security 
Council to produce and submit an annual strategy document.  
This section aligns with the original text from 1947, referencing “worldwide 
interests, goals, and objectives.” The nature of national security threats is understood in 
the same way, as Congress requests to be informed on the national defense capabilities 
“necessary to deter aggression”—which implies that these threats are, again, sentient 
actors who seek to destroy the United States.  
But Congress makes clearer to the Council that it must distinguish between short-
term and long-term uses of its resources and requires it to produce “an evaluation of the 
balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States 
to support implementation of the national security strategy.” These changes suggest an 
effort on part of Congress to shift national security prioritization in ways that it considers 
to be more strategic (and thus, less wasteful), balanced, and transparent. But mirroring 
the section of the National Security Act of 1947 that established the Council, this section 
is roughly a page long, suggesting that members of Congress may not have a clear idea of 
how to craft legislation regulating Council functions.  
The roughly 200-page Congressional Conferee report reveals more information 
on intentions behind requiring the national security strategy. Originally, the national 




41	Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization act of 1986, H.R.3622 — 
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feared this would overburden the military.42 This suggests that members of Congress 
viewed the functions of the military and National Security Council as interchangeable, 
again supporting the conclusion that military concerns are seen as indistinguishable from 
national security concerns.   
2. Major National Security Doctrines 
 
The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 
Isolationism and unilateralism were set in the first approaches to foreign policy in the 
United States, and were forever enshrined in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. At the time, 
President James Monroe was developing a U.S. foreign policy stance towards foreign 
powers that sought to meddle in the Americas. By that time, the U.S. had been 
independent from Britain for roughly 50 years, and most other former colonies 
throughout the Americas had gained independence from their colonizers. But imperialist 
interests in Europe remained, and the U.S. government was convinced that efforts would 
by those foreign powers to encroach upon the Americas once more.  
Monroe oscillated between making a joint declaration with Britain against foreign 
intervention in the Americas or following the general spirit of the U.S. founding 
philosophy and making a unilateral declaration. This was a question of practicality versus 
philosophy. While a joint declaration was more practical (the U.S. lacked the military and 
naval power to enforce a non-interventionist foreign policy stance alone), a unilateral 
declaration was more in line with avoiding foreign entanglements and remaining separate 
from European affairs. Monroe solicited advice from former presidents Thomas Jefferson 
and James Madison, who both supported a joint declaration. While Jefferson did agree 
that a unilateral declaration aligned best with U.S. founding principles, he thought that 
practicality should take priority. In a letter to Monroe, Jefferson wrote, “I am clearly of 
																																																								
42	Goldwater-Nichols Congressional Conference Report, Goldwater-Nichols Congressional Conference 
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Mr. Canning's opinion, that [a joint declaration] will prevent instead of provoking war. 
With Great Britain withdrawn from their scale and shifted into that of our two continents, 
all Europe combined would not undertake such a war.”43 
But Monroe’s Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, argued vehemently against a 
joint declaration with the British. A main reason had to do with his belief in the manifest 
destiny and U.S. expansion across North America. Scholar on the Monroe Doctrine, 
Dexter Perkins, writes, “There is some evidence that, at a date much earlier than 1823, 
Adams had begun to think of the American continents, especially the North American, as 
a special preserve of the United States, from which the rest of the world ought to be 
excluded.44  
Also, at that time the U.S. was dealing with the northwest question, which related to 
the joint U.S.-British occupation of the Oregon Territory and Russian land claims just 
above in most of what is now Alaska. A meeting between Adam’s and Canning, as 
recounted in Adam’s diary, reveals just how weary Adams’ was of British presence in the 
Americas. While discussing claims in the American northwest, Adams remarked to 
Canning in frustration, “I do not know what you claim nor what you do not claim. You 
claim India; you claim Africa; you claim—”45 Canning retorted, asking where Britain’s 
rights to lay land claims should end, to which Adams replied “We know of no right that 
you have here.”46  
Thus, from Adams perspective, a unilateral declaration gave the United States a 
convenient national defense justification to threaten against foreign encroachment and 
pursue its own expansionist interests. Ultimately, Adams was more persuasive and the 









isolationist foreign policy approach in line with the founding U.S. philosophies was the 
manifest functions of the doctrine, it also had important latent functions.  
The reasoning behind it was paternalistic, and represents a clever and opportunistic 
strategic move. It characterized European colonialism as abusive, but distinguished it 
from similar U.S. activities in the Americas by suggesting that the U.S. could only act out 
of an altruistic interest in America civilization. This is clear with respect to U.S. 
enforcement of the doctrine, which was uneven. The U.S. made a careful, self-interested 
calculus on when to enforce the doctrine. Adams saw establishing these principles early 
on as doing a better service to the country than rigid enforcement.  
The meaning of the Monroe Doctrine changed once the United States achieved “Great 
Power” status at the turn of the 20th century. President Theodore Roosevelt delivered the 
Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904. With his corollary, Roosevelt gave 
the U.S. a more active role, claiming the right to exercise “international police powers” in 
order to protect the Americas from “chronic wrongdoing.”47 
 
The Truman Doctrine of 1947 
The Truman Doctrine was delivered to Congress by President Truman ion March 12th, 
1947. He announced “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples 
who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” 
His announcement is considered the official beginning of the Cold War, as it “outlined 
the broad parameters of U.S. Cold War foreign policy: the Soviet Union was the center of 
all communist activity and movements throughout the world; communism could attack 





military and economic assistance to protect nations from communist aggression.”48 
Communist movements in Greece and Turkey, which many, including Truman, believed 
were orchestrated by the Soviet Union, catalyzed the doctrine.  
But some disagreed with Truman’s stance, noting that the insurgency in Greece was 
supported by Tito, the leader of Yugoslavia, and that there seemed to be a political 
division between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.49 Still, “the Truman Doctrine 
successfully convinced many that the United States was locked in a life-or-death struggle 
with the Soviet Union, and it set the guidelines for over 40 years of U.S.-Soviet 
relations.”50  
 
The Reagan Doctrine of 1985 
President Ronald Reagan insisted in 1985 that the United States must support its 
democratic allies who were risking their lives “on every continent… to defy Soviet-
supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth."51 
This talk of transitioning the Soviet Union away from communism and “engaging the 
Soviet Union in negotiations” was unrecognizable to Reagan’s foreign policy approach 
when he first acceded to the presidency in 1981. As promised during his campaign, he 
immediately sought to drastically decrease domestic spending and significantly increase 
defense spending, believing that the stronger the military the less change of an attack on 
US interests.52 During those early days of his presidency, he felt that “aggressive anti-
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communism, in particular, would protect the American-led capitalist system from 
infiltration and inspire more entrepreneurship.”53  
From his first days in office, he doggedly pursued firm anti-communist rhetoric. His 
stance was so strong that he even inspired fears at home that the United States would 
soon be engaged in direct military confrontations with the Soviet Union, and as a result 
he faced sharp criticism at home. As detailed by Dr. Jeremi Suri:  
 
“Reagan took these criticisms seriously, particularly when they encouraged 
voters to view his tough rhetoric with alarm. He reiterated his pledge to pursue 
peace through negotiations in every speech, even ones where he called the 
Soviet Union an ‘evil empire.’”54  
 
His adherence to the good versus evil binary thinking, even as he was trying to soothe 
concerned Americans, demonstrates how pervasive the view was of the Soviet Union as 
an “evil empire,” and how firmly Reagan believed it.  
Reagan also firmly believed that “American promises of freedom would attract more 
followers across the globe”55 and firmly denounced the idea of a status quo that depended 
on the “permanent vulnerability of American territory,” and based on that perception he 
viewed the theories surrounding mutually assured destruction to be illusory.56 But 
Reagan’s aggressive approach to fighting communism and projecting American power 
“did not bring peace, but just the opposite” according to Dr. Jeremi Suri.57  
Several events in 1983, which occurred as a direct result of Reagan’s U.S. foreign 
policies, appeared to make America less safe. They forced Reagan to reconsider his 








routine,” but once a series of missteps and blunders arose, he was immediately “scattered 
and over-scheduled like his predecessors.”58 Reagan’s narrative had offered him a sense of 
confidence and certainty—a sense of control. He was confident that he knew precisely 
what needed to be done in order to make the United States safer. But when the narrative 
began to crash down around him, he felt powerless and overwhelmed, and far more 
vulnerable in the chaotic environment he inhabited.  
A major turning point was when Soviets shot down an airplane that had accidentally 
strayed into Soviet territory. Without information on precisely why this had happened, 
Reagan assumed that it had been an intentional attack and labeled it the “Korean airline 
massacre.”59  
He announced to the nation and the world that the Soviets had attacked the “moral 
precepts” of the good people of the world and described the event as an “act of 
barbarism, born of a society which wantonly disregards individual rights and the value of 
human life and seeks constantly to expand and dominate other nations.”60 Reagan’s 
assumption that the incident has been intentional was rooted in a preconceived view of 
the Soviet Union as evil. His understanding of the event was dramatically altered by 
incoming intelligence suggesting that the Soviet were genuinely expecting a nuclear 
attack from the U.S.:  
 
“The military behaviors we have observed involve high military costs in 
terms of vulnerability of resources for the sake of improved national 
military power, or enhanced readiness at the price of consumer discontent, 






trivial costs, adding thereby a dimension of genuineness to the Soviet 
expressions of concern that is often not reflected in intelligence issuances.”61 
 
This intelligence forced Reagan to question his “tough guy” routine. He wrote in his 
diary “I feel the Soviets are so defense minded, so paranoid about being attacked that 
without being in any way soft on them we ought to tell them no one here has any 
intention of doing anything like that. What the h—l have they got that anyone would 
want.”62  
While Reagan previously believed that Soviet leaders were just as confident in their 
machinations to destroy the United States as he was in his perceived efforts to save it, in 
reality the Soviets were afraid of what they perceived as Reagan’s aggression.  Upon 
realizing that, Reagan never referred to the Soviet Union as an “evil empire” again, and 
worked to engage with Soviet leaders, even despite disapproval from the macro culture 
and especially “some of the most vocal Republicans [who] opposed any discussions with 
communists.”63 The major shift brought on by what Reagan viewed as counterintuitive 
intelligence may suggest the need for a shift in how intelligence is collected and 
presented.  
 
Deriving the Cultural DNA of the NSC:  
 
Based on this information, here are the Espoused Values; Formal Philosophies; Identity 
and Images of Self; Habits of Thinking, Mental Models, or Linguistic Paradigms; Shared 
Meanings of the US National Security Council:  
 












• Secrecy/Privacy  
 
Formal Philosophies: 
• The Constitution as a sacred text 
• Providing National Security at any cost 
• The NSC as the ultimate protector of the American people and the free world  
• Democracy is the only acceptable form of government 
• The United States is the ultimate democracy  
 
Identity and Images of Self: 
• Protectors of the free world 
• Protectors of the American people 
• Supporters of Democracy and Self-Determination 
 
Habits of Thinking, Mental Models, or Linguistic Paradigms: 
• Isolationism and non-intervention as the way of good 
• Democracy as the only legitimate form of government 
• Non-Democracy as a threat to global freedom 




• Stopping communism as the ultimate goal  
 
There are a number of patterns that emerge from this case study. The NSC has a 
tendency to value unilateralism and privacy, and at several moments in its history NSC 
members have disregarded major national values like freedom, due process, and self-
determination. This is rationalized as a necessary evil in ensuring safety for the American 
people. When it comes to national security, members tend to believe that the ends justify 
the means.  
This was not the case prior to World War II. That is because the emergence of nuclear 
weapons and threatening non-democratic states drastically altered understanding of the 
national security threats that the US faced. The stakes implicit the term “national 
security” rose dramatically as US leaders became doubtful that non-interference could 
keep the US from becoming embroiled in devastating wars or affected by major 
catastrophes. That change was the catalyst for the creation of the NSC, and has been 
central to its values and functions ever since.  
The most important takeaway from this chapter is that national security strategies are 
not, and at no time were, viewed by the Council as a tool for crafting national security 
strategies. But national security narratives are. Congress placed the annual strategy 
document requirement on the Council as a means of reigning in the Council’s 
disproportionately strong powers and improving transparency. Unfortunately, it did not 
appear to generate the desired effect, resulting in a precariously unbalanced state between 
the three branches of government. 
The NSC was established to manage disorder, which required clearer chains of 
command and a more coordinated response to foreign policy matters. Believing that the 
US had little time to prepare before an imminent clash with a new foe, the Soviet Union, 
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legislators scrambled to make structural changes. In their hastiness, legislators behaved 
recklessly when they produced the National Security Act of 1947 because they 
established a body without adequate Congressional oversight and they gave it a task that 
it could never accomplish given its entropy pattern. The National Security Council was 
created in less than 1,000 words. The structures were vague and so were the functions. 
There was little room made for Congressional oversight or a thought to the consequences 
of that.  
That void was filled with the act’s unique language, which was drawn directly from 
realist theory and the assumptions it held on the nature of national security threats and 
how to manage them. Realism shifted the understanding of war from something that 
could be eliminated forever to something that would always be on the immediate horizon, 
drastically increasing a sense of reliance on robust armed forces. The President and 
National Security Council were empowered via their responsibility to direct those forces. 
Those attitudes live on within the NSC to this day.  
But the NSC was also imbued with liberal attitudes. Mirroring values set down from 
the founding of the country, the National Security Council views non-democratic forms 
of government as a perpetual and inherent threat to the United States and the free world. 
It also maintains the belief that spreading democracy is a national security objective, and 
that the United States is capable of spreading democracy without exception. To fail, 
therefore, means that the failure must have occurred on an operational level.  
Because of how national security threats are perceived, members of the NSC tend to 
believe that threats draw from the characteristics and identity of an actor, as opposed to 
the behaviors of an actor. For as long as the actor maintains certain combinations of 
characteristic, such as a communist or authoritarian government with a large economy 
and military, the NSC will remain suspicious of it. This makes all national security 
threats very abstract in nature, and very difficult to translate directly into concrete 
objectives.  
	 43	
Also the NSC, as well as the macroculture that created it, tends to perceive the nature 
of national security threats as more covert in nature. This perception was the basis for the 
Central Intelligence Agency, which is fundamentally different from the State Department 
in that it is designed to keep secrets and collect intelligence that will specifically focus on 
national security threats, as defined in the act. The ability to engage in more covert 
activities and collect sensitive information is clearly a central aspect of how U.S. leaders 
understood the national security apparatus to function moving forward.  
One of the best examples of this is encapsulated in Suri’s book, The Impossible 
Presidency, when he writes, “Without him fully realizing it, Reagan’s strong beliefs 
empowered zealous staff members… Congress, the law, and other restraints looked like 
nuisances for an administration committed to getting big things done.”64 For members of 
the National Security Council, the pursuit of national security aims is sometimes so time-
sensitive and so critical for survival that it supersedes central US values like 
transparency, democracy, rule of law, and balance of powers.  
Ultimately, this series of cultural attributes has locked the NSC, its members, and the 
macroculture into a national security narrative that is difficult to escape. This narrative as 
it exists today is explored in more depth in a recent Arctic Institute article,65 but here is the 
general one derived from the connotations of doctrines included in this analysis:  
The Americas are spiritually and resource rich continents coveted by all, with North 
America as the spiritual center. The United States is endowed with special abilities as a 
result. It is predestined for good, representing the pinnacle of human morality. This 
places the US on top of a hierarchy above all other groups and sovereign entities in the 
Americas and the world. The greatest threat to US national security stems from powerful 





While abusive foreign powers seek to involve themselves out of a selfish interest in 
rich American resources and colonialism, the United States is restrained by its inherent 
goodness. Any power that defies the doctrine and intervenes in the Western Hemisphere 
must have nefarious intentions, making it an inherent threat to US national security 
interests. To protect itself and the rest of the Western Hemisphere, the US must take 
defensive military action in order to drive it away.  
This narrative reveals a paternalistic attitude towards the outside world, and an 
unfortunate consequence of that is leaders who rarely question their own assumptions 
about what they perceive as the primary national security threats and objectives. This 
narrative trap appears to have affected Truman and Reagan, who both fully believed that 
their respective foreign adversaries embodied an innate, total evil. Believing they knew 
best, they paid no mind to diplomatic tools or the value of dialogue. Truman was 
dismissive of facts that contradict his foreign policy narrative. Reagan rigidly follows his 
foreign policy narrative until, in a moment of chaos and extreme fear of nuclear war, he 
was receptive to information that ran contrary to that narrative.  
But a major cultural change did occur during Reagan’s presidency. When he 
could not escape the realization that his worldview towards the Soviet Union was flawed, 
he changed his behavior completely. He did this in spite of the public attitudes towards 
his shift because he valued his sense of integrity above the public’s opinion of him. It is 
possible for the national security policy process to change on a dime if leaders are 






The Security Council  of the Russian Federation 
 
This chapter is about the internal sources of entropy for the National Security 
Council of the Russian Federation (SCRF). It begins with five sections (outlined below) 
and concludes with a synthesis of the important behavioral patterns that they suggest—
the cultural DNA.  
 
The pieces of legislation and analysis of Putin to be examined are:  
1. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 1992  
2. Federal Law on Security of 2010  
3. Putin’s Rise to Power 1999-2008 
4. Putin’s 2012 Doctrine 
5. Putin’s Leadership 2012-Present 
 
I expect a close analysis of Putin’s role in setting the course of Russian national 
security policy and his interactions with the Russian and international macroculture to 
reveal how the Security Council of the Russian Federation has interpreted its role at 
various important moments in the Russian Federation’s history. I will identify any 
inconsistencies between within and amongst the content areas. From this, I will piece 
together whatever understanding emerges of the National Security Council’s unique 
cultural DNA. 
The content areas I will focus on in the final section are: Espoused Values; Formal 
Philosophies; Identity and Images of Self; Embedded Skills; Habits of Thinking, Mental 
Models, or Linguistic Paradigms. I expect to find inconsistencies between within and 
amongst the content areas.  
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The final section pieces together a unique SCRF cultural DNA depicting a body 
charged with holding the fabric of society itself together, but condemned to do so by 
leveraging paradoxical forces of freedom and tyranny.  
 
1.  Legislation Defining the SCRF and its Duties 
 
Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, June 3rd 1992 
The Security Council of the Russian Federation (SCRF) was established by 
presidential degree on June 3rd, 1992. The preceding six months had been incredibly 
tumultuous. Boris Yeltsin had been one of the primary architects of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, which occurred in late December of 1991. While Mikael Gorbachev, the 
USSR’s final leader, had tried to reform yet preserve the Soviet Union, Yeltsin had 
“decided to abandon the [communist] party completely” and in early 1991 had rushed to 
Lithuania in a show of solidarity with independence movements there.66  
In a desperate attempt to preserve the USSR, the KGB, the defense minister, and the 
interior minister took Gorbachev hostage and attempted to reverse reforms, recentralize 
power, and prevent further efforts by the Soviet republics to separate. Yeltsin and his 
supporters were able to overthrow the coup, and from that point forward Yeltsin 
increasingly flouted Soviet law, including withholding taxes from the central budget, and 
decreed that the Russian Communist party would be suspended.67  
At that time, the country was in shambles. The almost overnight dissolution of the 
USSR resulted in a power vacuum that would not be fully resolved (on paper) until the 
enactment of the Constitution of the Russian Federation on December 25th of 1993, which 






citizens found themselves and their economy woefully underprepared to handle the 
monumental task of constructing an entirely new country from the ground up.  
Much of that hardship was the direct result of Yeltsin’s efforts to transition towards 
a freer society, beginning on January 2nd of 1992. Throughout the year, Yeltsin faced 
stanch opposition to his approach, especially from the legislature. During this time, 
Yeltsin feared he would lose his special powers of decree. Constitutional amendments 
that granted him those powers were set to expire at the end of the year and could only be 
extended by parliament.68 Public support for Yeltsin also declined as inflation soared and 
the future of Russia looked increasingly bleak.  
It was midway through that year, on June 3rd of 1992, that Yeltsin established the 
Security Council of the Russian Federation by presidential decree. Yeltsin’s decree used 
the same ‘указ' heading as those of the Russian Monarchs and Soviet Leaders who had 
preceded him,69 and also had the same symbol of a hammer and sickle that had 
symbolized the Soviet Union.70 Neither of these elements suggests a major shift in how 
Yeltsin planned to lead the new country.  
Yeltsin’s decree On the Establishment of the Security Council of the Russian 
Federation begins “Considering the constitution of the Russian Federation and Laws of 
the Russian Federation “On Security,” I proclaim” and ends “the decree comes into force 
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at the time of signing.”71 Thus, Yeltsin used this decree to create an executive body 
outside the oversight from the legislative branch or any other government body.  
The purposes of this Security Council were to “ensure the implementation of the 
president’s functions of managing the state, shaping domestic, foreign and military 
security policies, building up the state sovereignty of Russia, maintaining social and 
political stability in society, and protecting the rights and freedoms of citizens.” The 
primary activities were identified as 1) preparing the President’s annual review on state 
security and executive programs on domestic, foreign, and military policy, along with its 
development of legal acts to protect vital interests from “external and internal threats,” 2) 
creation of permanent and temporary commissions “as the main tool” for developing the 
president’s draft decisions, 3) ensure that these activities are within legal limits.  
 
Federal Law on Security 2010 
The Russian Federation’s Federal Law on Security was passed in 2010, when the 
Russian Federation was roughly ten years old. After President Vladimir Putin had 
stepped down following the conclusion of his second term in 2008, he was acceded by his 
Prime Minister, Dmitri Medvedev. Putin was immediately appointed Prime Minister and 
a series of new laws and amendments to the constitution were enacted. One of them was 
the 2010 Federal Law on Security. 
There are reasons to suggest that these changes were made in anticipation of Putin 
once more running for president following the conclusion of Medvedev’s first term. 1) 
Putin’s rise to power suggests the continued political and economic influence of the 
Russian oligarchy following the fall of the Soviet Union, 2) Falling public support for 
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and fresh optimism for an enduring democratic state made the possibility of Putin seeking 
an illegal third consecutive presidential term risky, 3) the shift in state priorities 
suggested by the 2010 legislative changes suggests that the government was preparing for 
a new set of national security priorities, and that shift did in fact come once Putin secured 
the presidency in 2012.  
The document reads like a table of contents. It covers a vast amount of ground but 
contains few specifics. It is a series of chapters and articles with numbered lists. Each 
number rarely exceeds a single sentence or phrase, meaning there is broad room for 
interpretation. It also contains vague terms, which are crucial for a clear interpretation of 
the document but which are never defined. For example, it authorizes the government to 
institute “special economic measures” and secure “dual-use and civilian equipment” 
without explaining specifically what those may be or what they may be used for.  
The use of certain terms and phrasing also hints at the influences behind the text. 
According to the document, security activities include “the development and application 
of a set of operational and long-term measures to identify, prevent and eliminate security 
threats, and localization and neutralization of the sources of their manifestation.”72 This 
language reflects the language used by Russian philosopher Ivan Ilyin, one of Putin’s 
favorites, who championed fascism and totalitarianism. According to Snyder, Ilyin 
borrowed from the Nazi legal theorist Carl Schmitt when he wrote that politics is “the art 
of identifying and neutralizing the enemy.”73  
Structurally, the law is interesting because it is roughly eight pages and contains 
four chapters, but only addresses the Security Council in chapter three. The first two 
chapters define security, arguing that the legitimacy of the document is drawn from the 
Constitution of 1993, and explaining the powers and duties of the president, the 
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Chambers of the Federal Assembly, the government generally, and the powers of federal 
executive bodies in the field of security.  
While the law primarily addresses the powers and duties of federal and local 
government bodies, which must coordinate with the security council to ensure state 
security, there are a handful of references to the duties of citizens in ensuring state 
security. One of these references can be found in Article 4. State Security Policy, under 
which formal government bodies must work to satisfy the state security policy as 
determined by the president. But interestingly, there is also a requirement for self-
policing within the general public. It is explicitly written in this section “citizens and 
public associations participate in the implementation of state security policy.”74 Thus, 
citizen behavior is, according to the document, a legally enforceable component of state 
security.  
Chapter 3 begins with Article 13, which defines the Security Council in four parts. 
The first part establishes the council as a “constitutional deliberative body” responsible 
for preparing the president’s security decisions. The second establishes that the council is 
“formed and headed” by the president, the third reads that the president approves the 
council’s regulations, and the fourth reads that the president may establish working 
bodies for implementation as he or she sees fit.  
Two of the council’s main functions are legislative in nature. One is “consideration 
of draft legislative and other regulatory legal acts of the Russian Federation on issues 
within the competence of the Security Council” and the other is “preparation of draft 
regulatory legal acts of the President of the Russian Federation on security issues and 
monitoring the activities of federal executive bodies in the field of security.”75  
While the President of the Russian Federation is identified as a member of the 
Security Council, there are several moments where the Security Council is described as 
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an entity independent of the President. The only reference to decision-making authority 
of the other members is number five in Article 15 Composition of the Security Council, 
which reads, “members of the Security Council participate in meetings of the Security 
Council with an advisory vote.” In this sense, the decision-making responsibilities belong 
to the president, and the more logistical and administrative duties are the responsibility of 
the council’s other members.  
The fourth chapter nullifies nine preceding laws, enacted between 1992 and 2008, 
relating to national security.  
 
2.  Vladimir Putin 
President Vladimir Putin has been a top decision-maker for all but eight of the 
Russian Federation’s twenty-nine year history. He is the dominant figure in Russian 
politics, and the central authority on all Russian policies. The Russian government 
structure is often described as “vertical,” and he is the man on top. Vladimir Putin 
emerged from complete obscurity when he was appointed as Yeltsin’s Prime Minister in 
1999 and went on to serve as acting president.  
He was elected president in 2000 by an overwhelming majority, and served two 
terms until he stepped down in 2008. He served as Prime Minister for the next four years, 
and was re-elected again in 2012. He has been president ever since. While he remains a 
mysterious figure to many, and his rise to power is just as obscure, there are important 
circumstances and details about him that can be enlightening in understanding his vision 
for Russia, and his thoughts on Russian national security. “Putin’s inner circle maintains 
close supervision over economic activities in multiple ways: this can occur via their 
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occupying government positions, but also by being board members of energy companies, 
as well as through family networks or informal schemes.”76 
 
The Rise of Russian President Vladimir Putin, 1999-2008 
 
By 1999, Yeltsin and those nearest to him understood that the low public approval 
ratings, as well as Yeltsin’s deteriorating health, made it clear that Russia would soon 
have a new leader. The oligarchs who surrounded Yeltsin “wished to manage 
democracy” as they had managed economic privatization—in their favor.77 But they were 
not sure what type of leader or characteristics would be most appealing to the general 
public. They organized a public opinion poll on “favorite heroes in popular 
entertainment.” Snyder recounts that the winner was a character by the name of Max 
Sterlitz: “a hero of a series of Soviet novels that were adapted into a number of films, 
most famously the television serial Seventeen Moments of Spring in 1973. The fictional 
Stierlitz was a Soviet plant in German military intelligence during the Second World 
War, a communist spy in Nazi uniform. Vladimir Putin, who had held a meaningless post 
in the East German provinces during his career in the KGB, was seen as the closest match 
to the fictional Stierlitz.”78  
Little is known of Putin’s life prior to this time, but it has been posited that “[a]s a 
former KGB officer, Putin was a Chekist, as Russians still say, who wished to rule Russia 
through the Russian Orthodox Church.”79 Putin’s favorite film is “The Sword and the 
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Shield,” a Soviet TV series glorifying the Cheka—an early Russian security service from 
which the Russian KGB was born.80  
An interesting series of events followed over the next few months. Yeltsin 
appointed Putin to the position of Prime Minister that August, but due to his obscurity, 
Putin’s approval rating stood at 2%. Less than one month later, on September 9th, a series 
of bombings broke out in Russian cities and Putin’s display of “righteous patriotism” in 
declaring the Second Chechen War boosted his approval ratings to 45% by November.81 
Yeltsin resigned that December and endorsed Putin for president in the upcoming 
elections. This afforded the rising leader additional benefits from Yeltsin’s influence over 
the media and a manipulated electoral system—Putin received an absolute majority in the 
presidential election the following March.82  
The domestic fight against terrorism and increasing economic prosperity were 
hallmarks of Putin’s first two terms as president. As his crusade to protect Russia from 
the perceived subversive national security threats intensified, he abolished regional 
elected positions and made headway in consolidating power.83 Russians also rallied 
around the rapidly strengthening economy, which grew at a rate of 7% annually between 
Putin’s first and second term.84  
During this time, Russia experienced warming relations with the West: Putin 
offered Russian support to NATO after the attacks of September 11th, spoke favorably 
about the possibility of EU membership for Ukraine, and was careful not to portray 










High public approval ratings for Putin and his political party, United Russia, would 
largely be undone by the global financial crisis of 2008.  
 
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 2012 Doctrine 
 
During his first address to the Russian parliament after his re-election in 2012, Putin 
described his return to Russian leadership as fate. He reminded the audience of medieval 
Russian history, when his namesake, Volodymyr, brought Christianity to the lands of 
current day Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, binding them to a single destiny undergirded 
by a common culture and religion. Since that moment in 988, Putin explained, Russian 
Orthodoxy has been a distinct component of this shared cultural heritage.86 
This statement formed a new course for Russian foreign policy. Putin placed a 
renewed emphasis on Russian borders as being defined by a shared zone of culture and 
history, as opposed to being defined by international law.87 As Snyder puts it, “[s]uddenly, 
in 2012, Putin’s new doctrine challenged the very notion that Ukraine and Russia were 
legal equals who could sign a treaty.”88 Putin’s new attitudes set the course for the 
invasion of Crimea and all that would happen after.  
While Putin’s confidence makes it seem inevitable that Russia would continue 
down an increasingly authoritarian path, prior to the election of 2012, it appears only top 
Russian officials shared Putin’s confidence.  
In December of 2011, Medvedev made clear that he and Putin intended to “switch 







public interest in Putin resuming the office because he, like Medvedev, could not produce 
a compelling vision for on how to achieve economic growth.90  
That fear was strongly felt during the parliamentary elections December of 2011. 
Elections results accorded 26% of the vote to Putin’s party, United Russia. This was just 
enough to control parliament, but many questioned the results and made claims that 
uneven media coverage and physical and digital vote manipulation had been tools to 
subvert the democratic process.91 An estimated 50,000 protesters marched through 
Moscow on December 10th, and by December 24th, that number swelled to 80,000.92 
Within a month, protests across Russia collectively became the “largest protests in the 
history of the Russian Federation.93  
But rapidly growing discontent and increased scrutiny of the Russian Federations 
electoral process did not seem to impact Putin’s confidence. In an opinion piece 
published on January 23rd, 2012, Putin wrote to readers as their future president and set 
out his vision for the years to come.94 
Snyder explains that there was clear evidence the election had been rigged.95 In 
response to criticism, Putin did not seem to disagree and Medvedev noted that throughout 
Russian history, all elections had been fraudulent.96 
But just brushing off the discontent was not enough to secure Putin’s presidential 
term. And he could no longer use the threat of Chechen terrorists as he had in 1999 and 
2000.97 And so, by 2012, new narratives arose regarding the threat of Western decadence 













The Leadership of Russian President Vladimir Putin, 2012-Present  
 
Fostering a shared sense of Russian identity became Putin’s number one national 
security priority during his third term.  
In December of 2013, he instructed his top officials to complete a reading list over 
their New Year’s holidays.99 Included on the list were works from some of Putin’s 
favorite philosophers: Nikolai Berdaev, Vladimir Solovyov, and Ivan Ilyin. Officials 
were presented with copies of the books and sent on their way. 100 
While most books on the list are considered highly popular Russian classics, Dr. 
Andrei Teslya, a professor who specializes in Russian conservatism, points out that Ivan 
Ilyin’s text on fascism appears to stand out. 101 According to Snyder, Ilyin was a firm 
believer that “the future, like the past, belonged to empires.”102 Putin quotes books from 
the reading list from time to time, but his frequent references to Ilyin’s philosophical 
views, as well as the effort he made to bring Ilyin’s works back from obscurity suggest a 
very special role for this philosopher in Putin’s mind. 103   
Putin has also not been shy about the need to strengthen the influence of the Eastern 
Orthodoxy over Russian’s daily lives. A renewed emphasis on religious devotion as 
protection from a threatening, immoral West became a pillar of his plan to revive Russian 
greatness. During this time, libel and insults to religious sensitivities were made criminal 










public sphere.104 Powers and funding to the FSB, Russia’s domestic security service, were 
drastically increased, including a “broad authority to shoot without warning.”105 
Organizations that received funding from abroad, including all international 
organizations, were required to register themselves as foreign agents.106  
By 2013, Putin had launched a full on assault of gay rights. Putin had publicly 
equated same-sex partnerships to Satanism, emphasized Russian masculinity of Russian 
men, and identified the West and the source of Russia’s existential threats.107 He had 
expanded the powers of the FSB to combat so-called “foreign agents” and “subversives,” 
harkening back to centuries of perceived agents working to destroy Russia, and even 
renamed one organization after a top Cheka official.108 These efforts, and others, rapidly 
consolidated power under Putin and his national security apparatus.  
While the general sense of piety among the Russian people is unclear, there is a 
long history of religious identity as tied to national identity.109 That sense of community, 
which Putin sought to use as a unifier of Russian identity in his third term, set to work 
rooting out non-Russian “others.” By this time, the West had been identified as the single 
greatest national security threat to Russia. A number of changes were made to Russian 
laws and its national security apparatus in order to combat the threat of insurgency from 
what was then increasingly characterized as a decadent, nefarious West.  
Putin placed increasing emphasis on Russian culture as fundamentally at odds with 





























The SCRF Cultural DNA 
 
Espoused Values:  










Identity and Images of Self:  
• Russia and Russians deserves better  
• Russia should be a global power 
• The Russian president is the NSC  
• Putting it in writing makes it legitimate 
Embedded Skills:  
• Disinformation campaigns 
• Electoral manipulation 
• Plausible deniability 
• Signaling ahead of time 
Habits of Thinking, Mental Models, or Linguistic Paradigms:  
• Subversion by the West is the main national security threat 
• Uprisings are threatening  
• Autocracy is inevitable in Russia 
• There can only be one Russian leader, and that leader rules for life so long as they 
are competent 
 
What stands out most in this section is the “embedded skills” of the SCRF. Putin, in 
particular, seems highly attuned to what the people need and what bare minimum he must 
do to appease the general public. He knows that what unites Russians is a sense that they 
deserve better and that the country deserves to be a world power. He also seems to sense 
that there is a sense among Russians that it is inevitable that Russia will have an 
authoritarian leader.  
From this, Putin seems to have realized that so long as he can deliver on the great 
power status, he will be able to stay in power. It is unclear what Russia would do if it 
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achieved Great Power status, or if the public interest in Putin would change once Russia 
achieved it. There is public support for a shared cultural zone, but Russia has avoided 
direct military confrontation with the US. It was still willing to invade Crimea, though, 
because it was in the shared cultural zone.  
Putin’s reading list, the emphasis on traditional Russian values, and anti-Western 
rhetoric suggests that the values of Russianness and purity are central to achieving his 
goals.  
The Security Council’s authority supersedes legislative and judicial branches. As 
written, the document contains legislative and judicial powers that relieve those branches 
from exercising any authority over it. There are several references to the document being 
legitimate because it draws its power from the constitution, as well as the assertion that 
the council is a “constitutional” body, which suggests that no judicial oversight could be 
warranted. The council is also responsible for drafting laws that pertain to security 
matters, which is generally considered a distinctly legislative function.  
Something else striking is how well Putin signals what he is going to do and then he 
does it. This is important, because by signaling that something will happen and then 
following through, he strengthens his credibility in the eyes of his people. This means 
that if he says he is going to do something, he at least makes it appear that he has done it.  
Judging from all of this, it is clear that the Russian Federation was never a 
democracy, even in its early days. Yeltsin saw to it that the oligarchs maintained control, 
and the NSC was created as a way to assure that. Putin took the role of the NSC to a new 
level, and transformed national security into a powerful tool.  
Underlying this cultural DNA is an enduring narrative that Russia is the spiritual 
center of the shared Russian cultural zone. This cultural zone extends back into ancient 
times and as a result, Russia has sovereignty rights and special privileges in these areas. 
But over time, evil, abusive powers, particularly from the West, have chiseled away at 
Russian power, seeking at every turn to deprive it of the Great Power status that it 
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deserves. Only by restoring the moral purity and reverting back to earlier ways can 




The Arctic  
 
This paper began with a question of how national security bodies make decisions 
and the hypothesis that through Edgar Schein’s Model of Organizational Culture and 
Leadership, this paper could understand the US NSC and SCRF well enough to make 
national security predictions that are 1) accurate and 2) actionable/reasonable. The goal 
of this chapter is to see how well the derived understandings of NSC cultural DNA and 
SCRF cultural DNA align with NSC and SCRF behavior in the Arctic—i.e. how accurate 
they are.  
 
This is a rough timeline of major NSC and SCRF policies/communications in the Arctic: 
 
2000—Putin begins centralization of power over the Russian Arctic  
2001—Russian Federation releases its first Arctic strategy  
2007—Arctic expedition plants a Russian flag at the North Pole 
2008—Russian Federation releases its second Arctic strategy 
2009—The United States releases its first Arctic strategy  
2013— The United States releases its second Arctic strategy 
2017—Secretary of State Pompeo delivers controversial Arctic Council speech  
 
Although on the surface, these developments say very little, other than that the NSC 
significantly trailed the SCRF in prioritizing the Arctic as a national security focus, there 
is much more to say when looking at larger historical and macrocultural patterns that 
ultimately catalyzed increasing NSC and SCRF attention.  
The SCRF cultural DNA suggests continuity in Putin’s goal of attaining Great Power 
status in the Arctic, following queues from the Russian macroculture that date back to the 
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founding of the Russian Federation. This is in contrast to the common perception that 
Russian behavior in the Arctic was more peaceful and cordial up until Russian activities 
took on a new level of aggression in recent years.  
While some might argue that the sentiments expressed in former President Barack 
Obama’s 2013 Arctic Strategy and Secretary of State Michael Pompeo’s Roviemeni 
Speech to the Arctic Council could not be more different, applying the US cultural DNA 
demonstrates that they contain the same national security narrative outlined in chapter 
three, but emphasize different aspects of it.  
 
Applying the SCRF Cultural DNA 
The vast economic potential in the Arctic presents Russia not only with the chance to 
strengthen its economy, in spite of Western sanctions, but also to improve its global 
image. With a stronger domestic economy will come enhanced internal stability. Once 
the Russian economy is strong and its people placated, Putin can invest more in such 
things as green energy, environmental protection, and enhanced international trade—
efforts that can help Russia to take on the role of a powerful world leader, improving its 
soft power and international standing.  
In the early days of the Russian Federation, separate Arctic municipalities were left to 
fend for themselves. They developed independent governance structures as funding 
stopped arriving.114 Yeltsin’s policies towards the Arctic don’t link up with the attitude of 
the Russian macroculture. During this time, the Russian public took a renewed interest in 
the history of Alaska, and it was marked by conspiracy theories about “the West’s 
supposed desire to fragment Russia.”115 According to interviews that Marlene Laruelle, an 
expert on Russia’s Arctic policies, conducted with anonymous experts of Russia’s legal 
claims on the Arctic in 2010, it is not only “so-called nationalist authors” that view the 
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sale of Alaska with disdain and regret, but also “high-ranking officials with links to 
Arctic questions.”116 
In 1997, Yeltsin signed UNCLOS. As written by the RIA News article’s anonymous 
author, once the UN Convention on Law of the Seas was ratified by Russia in 1997, it 
“reduced our border” to the 200-mile economic zone and Russians lost their rights to the 
rest of the Arctic Ocean, which both Arctic and non-Arctic countries immediately began 
to claim.117  
That same year, Alexander Dugin, a contemporary Russian philosopher, publishes 
The Foundation of Russian Geopolitics, which becomes known as the “Russian Manifest 
destiny. In it, he writes that the Russian Arctic is “the shortest distance from Russia to the 
US territory,” which makes it a critical national security priority.118 Dugin writes that the 
Arctic is the spiritual center of Russia.119 
Shortly after winning the 2000 election, Putin undermined Arctic self-governance by 
diverting local Arctic tax revenues to Moscow.120 From that point forward, the presidential 
administration and the Russian Security Council directly set Arctic policy.121 But the 
Arctic only gains traction as a national security interest in the early 2000s, despite a 
vague and unimplemented first Arctic strategy.122 
In 2007, a Russian expedition sets out to collect evidence in support of claims to a 
significant area of the North Pole. Confident in the data that they collect, the expedition 
plants a Russian flag on the Lermontov Ridge, an underwater mountain range below the 
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North Pole. This gives the Russian people hope that the UN will “return what [Russians 
had] lost” upon ratifying UNCLOS.123  
Shortly thereafter, in 2008, the SCRF releases The Arctic Strategy of the Russian 
Federation through 2020. The Arctic Strategy of the Russian Federation through 2020, 
which was released in 2008, was far clearer in defining objectives and providing a 
roadmap for the Arctic than the first.124 The 2008 strategy “mentions a multitude of non-
traditional risks and the need for international cooperation among coastal countries, in 
particular in terms of search and rescue systems.”125 It seems more in line with the history 
of Russo-US relations in the Arctic than the anti-Western sentiment expressed in the 
Kremlin’s general rhetoric. 
Since then, evidence of much less cooperative behavior has come to light. Russians 
have always been touchy about the Svalbard Treaty, a treaty signed by the US, Great 
Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden in 1920.126 It 
determined that Svalbard, a strategically-located polar archipelago, was part of Norway. 
Ultimately, the USSR signed, but as written by the author, “the archipelago could once 
have become Russian” because Russian ancestors have been fishing there since the 16th 
century and archeologists have found evidence there of tradesmen from North Russia.127  
Non-Russian Arctic people have been the targets of Russian interference. For Finnish 
officials, fending off a Russian “hybrid war” of targeted disinformation campaigns “isn’t 
necessarily a new mission,” because ever since Finland declared independence from 
Russia in 1917, it was the target of “Kremlin-organized influence operations” throughout 
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These attitudes of the Russian macroculture and national security decisions relating to 
Arctic land claims demonstrate Putin’s ability to harness public support and take 
advantage of Russian feelings of mistreatment (SCRF’s embedded skills).  
 
Applying the NSC Cultural DNA 
 
According to the NSC cultural DNA derived in the third chapter, the NSC would not 
have considered the Arctic a national security priority unless developments suggested 
potential future military threats from an ideological enemy. That moment could easily 
have been the planting of the Russian flag on the Lermontov Ridge.  
The move would have immediately reminded US leaders of when they planted a flag 
on the moon during the “Space Race,” as this move was symbolic of the ideological 
battle between the two countries during the Cold War. And it appears to have been. The 
first US Arctic Strategy was released in 2009, and based on the timeline appears to have 
been catalyzed by the developments during the preceding two years.  
Further, the second US Arctic strategy, National Strategy for the Arctic Region, was 
released in 2013. It contains a comparison between Arctic development and construction 
of the international space station alludes to US-Soviet competition during the Cold War. 
The 2013 strategy document reads: "Just as a common spirit and shared vision of 
peaceful partnership led to the development of an international space station, we believe 
much can be achieved in the Arctic region through collaborative international efforts 
coordinated investments and public-private partnerships.”129  
The comparison suggests an acknowledgment from Obama that competition could 





129 National Strategy for the Arctic Region. 5 Oct. 2013. 
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manifest and latent functions in the NSC. While the NSC was created to uphold freedoms 
and other founding values, the interest of the NSC is minimizing the presence of threats 
in the Arctic. This catalyzes the appearance of elements of the enduring national security 
narrative.  
In conceptualizing the region as a frontier, the NSC deprives Arctic indigenous 
populations of any sense of history or agency, ignoring thousands of years of history. 
This behavior reveals attitudes similar to those of the Manifest Destiny, and signals an 
appeal to the US macroculture. Thus, the NSC views the development of the Arctic in a 
purely national security sense, as a means to an end, and far less as an end in itself. In 
short, Arctic development as described in this document is more about asserting 
ideological supremacy.  
Statements made by NSC members like Secretary of State Michael Pompeo 
reveal not only betray an arrogance and self-centeredness with regards to the Arctic, but 
also complete disregard for the cooperative tone in the Arctic, which has everything to do 
with the multilateral Arctic Council. During his opening speech at an Arctic Council 
meeting in Roviameni, Finland, Pompeo opened by sharing that he grew up about four 
minutes from Disneyland, which “claims to be the happiest place on Earth by trademark” 
so the Finnish people “have some work to do… get the trademark.”130 This was intended 
as a joke, but it fell flat.  
He then reminded the crowd that the United States and Finland have been “friends 
for an awfully long time” noting that they are celebrating 100 years of diplomatic 
relations.131 While this is true, it was a bit tone deaf to emphasize the 100 years marker 
without congratulating the Finnish people on their 100 years of independence. By what 





United States sets the bar for achievement in the Arctic, and the achievements worth 
celebrating are defined in relation to the United States. It is not in line with the tone of 
equality and cooperation in the Arctic and is much more in line with the national security 
narrative that everything ties back to the United States.  
Pompeo also warns attendees that Russia and China are turning the Arctic into an 
“arena for power and power competition” and are not following Arctic laws.132 His 
statements are far more in line with the national security narrative than with 
developments in the Arctic, and for this many attendees and observers criticized what 
they perceived as Pompeo’s aggression.133 
Less than favorable attitudes towards the United States remain as a result of NSC 
behaviors. In late January of 2020, the High North News published an article on “the 
silencing of Arctic cultures” by multiple actors, including the United States. Professor 
Kirsten Hastrup of the University of Copenhagen described US treatment of Greenland in 
the early 1950s, when the United States had 100 locals “forcefully removed” in order to 
construct a military base, which was central in establishing a front towards the USSR.134 
This decision suggests that at the very least during the 1950s, the NSC valued its desire to 
protect the US above protecting the freedoms and rights to self-determination of the 
area’s inhabitants.    
In the process of constructing a nearby camp, a reactor was destroyed by the 
weight of the ice sheet it was under. The US abandoned the camp but never cleaned up 
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the mess from the reactor, which to this day is described as a symbol of US hypocrisy and 
callous exploitation, or an “imperial brumation,” as put by Professor Hastrup.  
Applying the model appears to reveal information that suits geopolitical 
developments in the Arctic. It also suggests that while many circumstances have evolved 
in the Arctic, both the US NSC and SCRF have continued to act in ways consistent with 





This paper’s goal was to make Arctic geopolitics more predictable by investigating  
the suitability of Edgar Schein’s Model of Organizational Culture and Leadership for 
understanding how the United States National Security Council and Security Council of 
the Russian Federation produce national security policies.  
Based on the understanding of NSC and SCRF cultural DNAs produced by the third 
and fourth chapters, respectively, and how well they appear to coincide with US and 
Russian Arctic national security policies, this paper concludes that Schein’s model is 
capable of offering specific predictions on the Arctic.  
Schein’s model calls attention to sources of evidence, such as an organization’s 
founding legislation, that would not traditionally be considered when researching Arctic 
geopolitics. Analyzing the founding legislation of both the NSC and SCRF in their 
respective historical contexts yields insights that would not have come up otherwise.  
The utility of examining shifts and continuities in national security doctrines, 
something more commonplace in political science, is amplified by Schein’s model, which 
encourages the identification of latent and manifest functions. This is useful in drawing 
distinctions between the organizational culture and the macroculture, which does quite a 
bit to explain major sources of hypocrisy. More than anything, the insights from both 
case studies suggest that both countries feel entitled to the Arctic, but for very different 
reasons.  
The model suggests that both the NSC and SCRF have imperialistic tendencies and 
draw from narratives that extend back centuries. Those tendencies manifest differently 
because each council’s respective conceptualization of national security is culture-
specific. In that way, the past continues to have a major bearing on future decision-
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making for both bodies. As a result, distinctive patterns of philosophies, values, and other 
attributes are visible in the Arctic policies of both organizations.   
In order to grasp the NSC cultural DNA, one must recognize that ever since the 
conclusion of the Second World War, the United States has feared what it perceives as 
hostile, non-democratic countries. Schein’s model, though, leads one to the suspicion that 
the source of fear has been misidentified. Unable to accept a reality where war and 
nuclear attacks would always be a possibility, the United States created the National 
Security Council on a faulty premise that the US can win preventative ideological wars.  
From its founding, the NSC was imbued with that same mindset. What the NSC 
truly fears is a nuclear holocaust, which its members believe will ultimately result if non-
democratic countries become too powerful. Everything the NSC does is an effort to 
project power and control, even when that means forcing the US’s own democratic values 
to take a back seat. 
In order to grasp the SCRF cultural DNA, on the other hand, one must recognize that 
Russia has a rich history extending back thousands of years. Both during imperial times 
and under the Soviet Union, Russia’s reach extended much further. But for much of 
Russia’s more recent history, it has been under the control of a number of controversial 
leaders. Russians see a legacy chipping away, and feel a pressure to confront painful 
histories while at the same time using those histories to create a shared sense of identity.  
It was optimism in the new Russian Federation to set a new course that led Yeltsin to 
create the SCRF, he recognized that his goals as president were not in line with the 
general public’s interest in a democracy and a capitalist market that benefitted all. The 
SCRF will do whatever it takes to strengthen itself as a country, even if that means 
playing to its imperialist past.  
When it comes to the Arctic, the Russian Federation’s Security Council sees 
opportunity while the US Security Council sees a growing threat. Russia’s sovereignty 
claims in the Arctic are largely viewed as legitimate according to international law.  
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The United States NSC cannot see past the history of the Cold War and what it 
perceives as the encroachment of a hostile, non-democratic country.  
But questions still remain of how capable the model is for creating those predictions 
and how accurate the predictions will be. So the next step is to make predictions below, 
using the insight garnered in this thesis to justify them: 
 
Prediction 1. Alaska will become the target of Russian disinformation 
campaigns, with the parallel goals of driving a wedge between Alaskans 
and the US government and boosting the sense of a cultural connection to 
Russia.   
 
The SCRF has a special talent for disinformation campaigns, and as a result uses 
targeted disinformation attacks as a means of fostering public discontent in strategic areas 
in Russia’s shared cultural zone. Not only was this the first sign that Putin would invade 
Crimea, but it is also currently happening in Scandinavian countries like Finland, which 
Russia perceives as being connected to that shared cultural zone.  
Because Putin’s interest in the Arctic is about identity, economic power, and great 
power status, being able to deliver on these national security objectives is critical to his 
overall national security priority: to stay in power. These targeted disinformation 
campaigns have proven surprisingly effective. Because Russians see Alaska as rightfully 
part of the Russian Arctic, and because the United States had neglected Alaskan 
indigenous peoples and other Alaskan residents, Alaska is a prime target for Russian 
disinformation campaigns.  
While the SCRF may at some point consider an invasion of Alaska, it may also seek 
to work through US democratic processes in the form of using disinformation campaigns 
to influence elections. This is particularly strategic because if Alaska secedes, the US will 
no longer be an Arctic state and lose most of its  leverage in the region. 
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Prediction 2. Continued aggression towards Russia and China in the 
Arctic will help the two countries to gain influence in the Arctic, and 
result in the waning of US influence.  
 
Most Arctic countries hold sacred the history of cooperation in the Arctic. That is 
why aggressive US stances towards Russia and China have not only been met with 
disapproval, but have also weakened US soft power in the Arctic. This behavior adds to 
other instances in the Arctic and elsewhere when the NSC did not live up to US values 
and gives the impression that the US is hypocritical. If the US national security threats in 
the Arctic deal largely with Russia and China gaining ideological influence in the Arctic, 
then this behavior is counterproductive.  
 
Prediction 3. Russia will not initiate a military attack against the United 
States in the Arctic.  
 
Contrary to what the NSC communicates explicitly, the fostering of anti-Western 
sentiment in Russia serves the latent function of reducing public discontent. A military 
confrontation would likely result in further economic penalties, either directly or 
indirectly, and this would not be in Putin’s national security interests. Also, the Arctic is 
Putin’s best chance of improving Russia’s economic situation, as well as attaining great 
power status.  
Since international law and sentiments of Arctic countries towards Russia are at least 
not heavily strained, Putin has every interest in not testing his luck by risking these 
favorable circumstances. Finally, if the Arctic is such a site of opportunity for Putin, why 
would he destroy it by launching a military attack that would inevitably escalate?  
 
	 74	
Suggested Improvements for Further Research 
As for Schein’s model, itself, it is clear that applying it to a national security 
apparatus is a monumental task that is far broader than the scope of this project. But 
based on what it helped to produce, this thesis concludes that it is worthwhile.  
But there are some recommendations on undertaking such a project in the future. 
There are a number of specialties that should be brought together to do this: a geographer, 
historian, legal analyst, ethnographer, strategist, organizational communications expert 
and behavioral scientist, at the very least.  
This study was also limited because I could not interact with individuals directly. 
Schein intended for consultants to directly observe their targets, but due to the nature of 
these secretive bodies, that is unlikely to ever be permitted. Also, I am already familiar 
with these institutions and with the discipline (so I already have assumptions and biases 
that color my thinking). 
Since this research suggests that the US national security narrative has been 
detrimental to the NSC pursuit of national security aims, it is important to more clearly 
point out to policy makers the danger of relying too much on this narrative. Firmly 
pointing out its inconsistencies may be enough to change behavior amongst NSC 
members in the future.  
I would need the predictions to be looked at by a national security professional to 
know whether they sound 1) reasonable and 2) actionable/realistic. It will also take time 
to see if any of these predictions come true.  
But I recommend that others to follow up with similar evaluations of whether 
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